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From the start, emancipatory theory has been plagued by contradic-
tory and incompletely elaborated normative underpinnings that 
weaken its sociological and ethical credibility. Jiirgen Habermas, 
the leading contemporary critical theorist, has attempted to address 
this problem in an extensive reconstruction of the theories of Marx 
and Weber that appropriates elements of American pragmatist 
thought. Yet he resorts to an evolutionary normative argument that 
undermines the sociological powers of the two classical theories and 
contradicts the pragmatists' historical approach to values. This es-
say explains the significance of Habermasian theory for the eman-
cipatory tradition, analyzes certain problems of the theory, and 
argues that an expanded dialogue with American pragmatism 
would strengthen both its sociological and its normative dimen-
sions. Though the explicit focus is on the emancipatory tradition, 
the essay raises broader critical questions about pseudohistorical, 
normative justification in general sociological theory. 
The relation of fact to value has long been a central problem in the social 
sciences and a particularly controversial issue for partisan approaches 
that advocate sweeping social transformations. Since its inception during 
the Enlightenment, "critical" sociology has faced difficult questions about 
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the grounding of the value positions that orient its critiques. Without 
rationally justified normative foundations, evaluations of "exploitative" 
or "oppressive" social conditions and prescriptions for "emancipatory" 
social change seemed arbitrary. 
But under the disenchanted conditions of modernity, direct appeals to 
a priori valuative "truth" (ethical "rightness") have been discredited 
within most critical intellectual circles. Consequently, in defense of their 
orienting values, social theorists have often supplanted religious and 
philosophical absolutism 2 with evolutionary claims about normative va-
lidity. 3 Evolutionary justification upholds values on the basis of their 
correspondence with an allegedly progressive direction of historical devel-
opment (e.g., toward market society or toward socialism) and implies that 
these values would be experienced as universally binding under the 
demystified social conditions of a "higher" historical stage. The hypothet-
ical value consensus and theoretical collective subject justify efforts to 
usher in the new historical stage. This pseudohistorical defense of value is 
an incompletely secularized version of absolutism and, like the earlier 
foundationalist arguments, presumes normative grounds outside critical 
dialogue. 
Pragmatic arguments can often be found alongside evolutionary claims 
about universal normative validity and universal consensus. 4 But in this 
2 Absolutism refers to positions that make claims about ultimate truths and ultimate 
realities beyond sense experience and scientific inquiry. These positions depend upon 
revelation or rational intuition, or both. 
3 Evolutionary normative arguments have not been monopolized by leftist thinkers. 
For example, £mile Durkheim ([1893] 1964, pp. 374-88) provided an evolutionary 
basis for equal opportunity, liberty, and social justice, and Talcott Parsons ([1966/ 
1971] 1977, pp. 182-241) defended the modern American versions of these liberal 
values in a similar fashion. Likewise, Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner 
defended laissez-faire on evolutionary grounds, as does the leading modern proponent 
of this tradition, F. A. Hayek (Hayek 1983; Gray 1984, pp. 41-55; Antonio 1987). 
4 Foundationalist universalism, as expressed either in evolutionary normative argu-
ments or in ethical absolutism, must be distinguished from the modest and defensible 
universalism inherent in any consistent ethical vision—i.e., moral action is based on 
"objective" considerations beyond fleeting individual desires and invokes principles 
("good reasons") that apply in all like cases. Pragmatist ethics embraces this modest 
form of universalism. Conversely, foundationalists argue for a much more comprehen-
sive universality that endows norms with binding transcultural and transhistoricaJ 
moral authority. Most important, they seek to escape relativism by establishing an 
ultimate normative "ground" or "foundation" to orient historical valuation. This dis-
tinction is crucial because foundationalist moralists contend that the first type of 
universalism is impossible without the comprehensive form and, consequently, equate 
historicist ethics with moral relativism or nihilism. I follow the American pragmatists, 
who argued that moral principles and moral actions do not require knowledge of what 
is right across cultural and historical contexts. See Arthur Edward Murphy (1965, pp. 
271-352) and John Dewey and James Hayden Tufts ([1932] 1985, pp. 275-83) for 
incisive criticism of foundationalist universalism. 
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case, normative justification derives from a value's ability to hold sway in 
social dialogues about societal institutional arrangements, about the ca-
pacity of these arrangements to meet the needs of community members, 
and about the various empirical conditions that bear on these matters. In 
these dialogues, traditional normative symbols are reformulated to ad-
dress existing social conditions, needs, and possibilities for change. Fi-
nally, the emergent moral understandings are not end points but, instead, 
constitute moments of an ongoing social dialogue that leads to still newer 
understandings. Although it appears implicitly in many varieties of social 
theory, the American pragmatists have expressed this communicative 
ideal most directly and comprehensively. The pragmatist broadside 
against foundationalism makes emphatically clear their view that norma-
tive validity rests exclusively on the secular grounds of culturally specific, 
intersubjective understandings that arise within historical communica-
tion communities. 
Most of this essay focuses on the thought of Jiirgen Habermas. As I will 
demonstrate below, emancipatory theory, 5 from the start, has been 
plagued by contradictory and incompletely elaborated normative under-
pinnings that undermine its sociological and ethical credibility. Haber-
mas traces the root of this problem to Karl Marx but also contends that 
critical theorists* efforts to shore up emancipatory theory with ideas from 
Max Weber did not improve matters. In his view, neither classical theo-
rist elaborated the grounds of his normative standpoints, and to make up 
this deficit, Habermas incorporates the pragmatists' communicative ideal 
into the heart of his own theory. Yet in elaborating his intersubjective 
approach to normative justification, Habermas resorts to evolutionary 
argumentation and quasi-foundationalist universalism, 6 which diminish 
5 Emancipatory theory refers to the broader Hegelian-Marxian tradition of theorizing, 
whereas critical theory designates the strain that began with the Frankfurt School in 
the 1920s and continues today in different types of research and theory. Both ap-
proaches contain numerous heterodoxies and escape simple definition. See Martin Jay 
(1973, 1984a) for fairly comprehensive intellectual histories of the two traditions. 
6 Habermas ([1981] 1987c, pp. 396-403) seeks a nonrelativistic normative foundation 
for emancipatory theory but, at the same time, wants to derive it from actual social life 
and to be able to defend it on scientific as well as intuitive grounds. By calling it quasi-
foundationalist, I mean that, contrary to classical religious and philosophical founda-
tionalism, Habermas's position does not rest on a priori claims, which are, in principle, 
beyond empirical inquiry. Habermas must reject classical foundationalism because it 
contradicts his effort to put emancipatory theory on a purely intersubjective basis open 
to consensual validation. But, as I will explain below, the dividing line between the 
two positions is not that great, and, despite Habermas's analytic qualifications and 
affirmations of value pluralism, his core normative argument tends toward the founda-
tionalist universalism described above in n. 4 and, consequently, breaks with prag-
matist ethics. 
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the sociological powers of emancipatory theory and contradict his fusion 
of pragmatism and critical theory. 
THE DUAL ORIGIN OF EMANCIPATORY THEORY: 
EVOLUTIONARY VERSUS HISTORICAL IMMANENT CRITIQUE 
Emancipatory theorists have argued that superordinate social strata, 
since the Enlightenment, have justified their dominance with democratic 
legitimations and that emancipatory movements have arisen in response 
to these unfulfilled normative claims. Their Hegelian-Marxist "immanent 
critique" was supposed to side with the normative standpoints of social 
movements (or potential social movements) that struggle to reduce exploi-
tation, coercion, and inequality and, therefore, to close the gap between 
Enlightenment values and social reality (Jay 1973, p. 63; Schroyer 1975, 
pp. 27-37; Guess 1981, pp. 26-44, 55-63; Antonio 1981, 1983). Marx 
employed two types of immanent critique that became the basis for 
sharply different modes of "emancipatory" theorizing. 7 
Marx argued that advancing productive forces generate a sequence of 
class struggles, producing ascending "historical" stages (i.e., tribal, an-
cient, feudal, and capitalist modes of production) and culminating in a 
rational terminus to human "prehistory" (communism). 8 Temporally ex-
perienced needs and empirical conditions that contradict the evolutionary 
pathway are dismissed as "false consciousness" or as temporary side-
tracks incapable of derailing the transhistorical motor force. Here, the 
emancipatory normative standard is "validated" by a nonfalsifiable evo-
lutionary metalogic beyond social dialogue. 
Conversely, Marx also criticized early capitalist society from the per-
spective of its own bourgeois values of freedom, democracy, and plenty. 
Moreover, he concluded, on the basis of his reading of determinate histor-
ical conditions, that developmental tendencies of early capitalism were 
not only intensifying exploitation and misery but were also strengthening 
the social bonds among the growing mass of wage laborers and creating 
7 Although they can be distinguished analytically, they are not always separated in Marx's texts. Marx used elements of his historical immanent critique of early capi-talism in his evolutionary materialism, and the reverse. 
8 Marx mentioned these stages of history briefly (e.g., see Marx and Engels [1845-46] 
1964, pp. 27-95; Marx [1859] 1970, pp. 20-22). As William H. Shaw (1978, pp. 114-15) points out, capitalist development was Marx's overarching interest, and he framed the precapitalist modes of production from this viewpoint (also, see Cohen 1978; McMurtry 1978; Rader 1979). However, there is another side to Marx's materialist epistemology that is methodologically defensible and is not reducible to his teleological stages of history (e.g., see Ste. Croix 1984; Ste. Croix 1981, pp. 31-111). Finally, 
Habermas ([1976] 1979a; Habermas [1976] 19796, pp. 130-77) has commented criti-cally on Marx's evolutionary materialism. 
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the means to satisfy their unmet needs. On this basis, he reconstructed 
bourgeois values into a more oppositional normative standard, repre-
senting the nascent standpoint of the proletarian movement. Questions 
about the long-term accuracy of this scenario are beside the point. In 
contrast to his evolutionary teleology, the bold claims of Marx's historical 
argument were open to empirical investigation and critical debate. Here, 
normative justification depended on whether the portrayals of societal 
contradictions and of unmet needs expressed accurately the primary ten-
sions of the historical conjuncture and, on this basis, whether the values 
in question would gain a wider hold on public consciousness and generate 
emancipatory struggles that would reshape institutional arrangements 
accordingly. 
Despite the openness of his historical immanent critique, Marx never 
elaborated its underlying pragmatic grounds, nor did he express aware-
ness of the problematic nature of achieving intersubjective understand-
ings. On the contrary, he spoke as if normative truth and social reality 
were transparent to the materialist and that, in the absence of "fetishism" 
and "false consciousness," the brute facticity of the contradiction between 
bourgeois values and reality would be readily apparent, as would be the 
means for its overcoming. Even in his historical immanent critique, Marx 
failed to consider adequately the patterns of communication and bases of 
intersubjective agreement necessary for the rise of an emancipatory pro-
letariat (see Sherover-Marcuse 1986), and this problem would long plague 
the emancipatory theory tradition. 
PESSIMISTIC CRITICAL THEORY 
AND HABERMAS'S PROBLEMATIC 
The two normative arguments in Marx's writings later were expressed in 
separate Marxist traditions. The crude evolutionary arguments of official 
Marxists insisted that the materialist metalogic operated beneath the phe-
nomenal forms of modern society, guaranteeing eventual delivery to the 
promised land of emancipation. Their Stalinist "diamat" (dialectical ma-
terialism) validated the power of the party by demanding unconditional 
acceptance of its ultimate normative ends. Western Marxists, however, 
responded to changing historical conditions and began to rethink Marx's 
political project (see Jay 1984a; Gouldner 1980). 
At first, critical theorists believed that the contradiction between En-
lightenment values (i.e., freedom, democracy, and plenty) and capitalist 
socioeconomic organization still contained seeds of an emancipatory 
transformation, and thus they retained a strong, underlying Marxist 
framework (Dubiel [1978] 1985, pp. 11-67; Held 1980, pp. 29-76). But 
their historical immanent critique led them eventually to abandon most of 
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the substance of Marx's theory. To confront the new types of corporate 
capitalist and totalitarian regimes, critical theorists borrowed heavily 
from Max Weber's theories of rationalization and bureaucratization and 
wove them into their own increasingly pessimistic vision of a "totally 
administered society" (see Kellner 1985; Benhabib 1986, pp. 182-85). 
Under the dark clouds of fascism and Stalinism, they came to believe that 
critical theory, at best, provided a theoretical sanctuary to preserve oppo-
sitional values until the rise of new historical conditions (Dubiel 1985, 
pp. 69-97; Benhabib 1986, pp. 147-85; Wolin 1987). 
After World War II, capitalist abundance divided and depoliticized the 
working class, postponing indefinitely the arrival of the emancipatory 
proletariat. Critical theorists contended that consumer society emptied 
bourgeois values of oppositional content and transformed them into a 
"one-dimensional" legitimation of possessive individualism (e.g., see 
Marcuse 1964). Because they considered the cultural basis for historical 
immanent critique to be defunct, postwar critical theorists shifted to a 
politically disengaged critique of Enlightenment rationalism and a philo-
sophical defense of critical thought. In their "dialectic of Enlightenment" 
phase, most critical theorists abandoned both Marxism and its ideal of 
class emancipation (e.g., see Horkheimer [1947] 1974; Horkheimer and 
Adorno [1944] 1969; Adorno [1966] 1973). 
Jiirgen Habermas wanted to revive the Enlightenment project that 
critical theorists had left behind (Habermas 1981a; Habermas 1985a, 
pp. 75-79; Jay 1984a, pp. 462-509) but could not shed completely their 
pessimistic cultural critique. He agreed that "bourgeois consciousness has 
become cynical" and implied that widely accepted oppositional "norms 
and values to which an immanent critique might appeal" were in eclipse 
(Habermas 19796, p. 97). 9 
But despite his doubts about bourgeois morality, Habermas contends 
that the normative underpinnings for a critical standpoint could be found 
within the patterns of communication beneath the surface of substantive 
public dialogue. Critical theorists, however, were oblivious to this taken-
for-granted normative dimension because of inherited metatheoretical 
baggage from Marx and Weber. Although their sociologies contained a 
vague normative ideal of "broader societal rationality" (e.g., Habermas 
1984, pp. 144-45; Habermas 19856, p. 192), the two classical theorists 
failed to elaborate its precise shape and explain its intersubjective moor-
9 Habermas's portrayal of the erosion of public life (Habermas 1962; Habermas [1964] 
1974; Habermas [1968] 1970, pp. 50-122; Hohendahl 1974, 1979) by mass society and 
technocratic ideology is reminiscent of the older generation's views about "one-
dimensionality," "total administration," and "the culture industry." These themes still 
can be detected in revised form in his later work (Habermas [1981] 1984, pp. 396-99; 
Habermas 1987c, pp. 153-97, 303-83). 
726 
Theory 
ings, leaving them without the necessary perspective to discover the com-
municative ground of emancipatory norms. Habermas attempts to escape 
the resignation of pessimistic critical theory by elaborating the approach's 
repressed normative foundation in a reconstruction of its Marxian-
Weberian roots. 
HABERMAS'S CRITIQUE OF MARX: SPLITTING THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND NORMATIVE DOMAINS 
Since Marx's critical normative stance cannot be elaborated from his 
materialist epistemology, Habermas ([1968] 1971, pp. 43-63; Habermas 
1979/?, pp. 95-98) starts his reconstructive effort by attacking technologi-
cal determinism and rejecting the Marxian equation of material progress 
with social progress. In his view, Marx's "forces of production" and 
"relations of production" had to be reformulated and the strict subordina-
tion of superstructure to base abandoned. Because historical materialism 
does not distinguish the rationality that governs voluntaristic social rela-
tions from that which guides instrumental manipulations of nature, it 
cannot express adequately the modes of communication and intersubjec-
tivity through which emancipatory values are formulated and gain social 
consensus (Habermas 19796, pp. 138-52; Habermas [1963/1971] 1973, 
pp. 142-69). This prototechnocratic side of Marx's thought affirms the 
depoliticization and bureaucratization of advanced industrial societies. 
By equating technological and administrative rationalization with de-
mocratization, Marxism forfeits its critical capacities and fails to address 
the primary normative question of modern emancipatory theory (i.e., 
"How can the power of technical control be brought within the range of 
the consensus of acting and transacting citizens?") (Habermas 1970, p. 
57). 
Habermas "reconstructs" Marxism by rejecting its comprehensive con-
cept of productive-force primacy 1 0 and by separating the sphere of techni-
cal rules, technical control, and productive forces from that of social 
norms, human reciprocity, and communication (Habermas 1970, pp. 91-
94, 113; Habermas 1971, pp. 43-63; Habermas 1973, pp. 142-69; Haber-
mas 19796, pp. 130-77; Giddens 1982). Labor and interaction are then 
1 0 Though, at first, Habermas (1970, pp. 113-14; Habermas 1973, pp. 168-69) for-
mally accepts the primacy of material factors in societal evolution, he (19796, p. 146) 
later states that "the development of productive forces . . . triggers but does not bring 
about the overthrow of relations of production and evolutionary renewal of the mode 
of production. But even in this formulation the theorem can hardly be defended. . . . " 
Habermas ([1985] 1987a, pp. 321-22) softens this position even further in his recent 
work. Therefore, his "reconstructed" historical materialism bears little resemblance to 
Marx's version. 
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employed to designate the respective domains of organizational rational-
ity and communicative rationality and to replace Marx's materialist con-
cepts of productive forces and relations. The new categories are the intel-
lectual axis of an approach that deviates sharply from the original theory 
that Habermas wants to rescue. Though his critique of technological 
determinism is laudable, Habermas's reconstruction also breaks with 
Marx's dialectical treatment of socioeconomic structure and societal 
legitimations. The distinction between labor and interaction provides a 
rationale for treating the organizational and normative spheres as semi-
autonomous domains with opposed logics of development. 1 1 Habermas 
then looks for critical theory's normative grounding solely in the sphere 
of interaction and, particularly, in the subtle, universalistic, taken-for-
granted attributes of human communication. 
HABERMAS'S RECONSTRUCTED WEBER: 
T H E S U N N Y SIDE OF D I S E N C H A N T M E N T 
Habermas believes that Weber's analysis of cultural rationalization offers 
a better substantive starting point than Marx's work for clarifying critical 
theory's underlying conception of "broader societal rationality." Conse-
quently, he refracts the Marxian emancipatory project through a strong 
Weberian lens. 1 2 But in his search for normative underpinnings, Haber-
mas ultimately breaks with Weber almost as sharply as he does with 
Marx. The differences with Weber derive mostly from Habermas's effort 
to elaborate a brighter side to disenchantment. Habermas emphasizes a 
growing capacity for ethical consensus to be separated from material 
interest, whereas Weber stressed an expanding value conflict mired in an 
increasingly materialistic worldview. Following an idealist strain in re-
cent German Weber scholarship (see Kalberg 1979), 1 3 Habermas con-
1 1 Three qualifications are in order. First, Habermas (1984, pp. 397-99; Habermas 
1987c, p. 343) acknowledges the role of material interests and does not substitute 
idealism for materialism. Second, he (19796, pp. 158-77; 1983; 1987a) implies, at 
least, a highly generalized interactive codevelopment of the organizational and norma-
tive spheres (e.g., certain features of the abundance and organizational differentiation 
of modernity foster ethical and communicative rationalization). Finally, Habermas 
intends to revise, not to abandon, Marxism (see 1987c, pp. 332-96). 
1 2 Habermas addresses Weber most comprehensively in his study of communicative 
action (1984, pp. 143-271, 345-65; Habermas 1987c, pp. 303-31). Although he did 
not previously provide much textual commentary on Weber, strong Weberian in-
fluences can be detected in his earlier writings. But Habermas (1985a, p. 77) states that 
he "first began a more intensive study of Weber" after 1971. 
1 3 These thinkers (e.g., Schluchter 1979, 1981; Tenbruck 1980) do not pose monistic 
idealist causation or deny the significance of material interests. On the other hand, 
they do consider the writings on religion as the center of Weber's work (instead of 
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structs a logic of progressive ethical rationalization from Weber's writings 
on religion and opposes it to the type of rationalization described in 
Weber's political sociology and organizational analysis. 
The Weberian flavor of Habermas's "reconstruction" of Marx results 
partly from the fact that he translates the central concepts of labor and 
interaction into the language of neo-Weberian action theory. Habermas 
equates labor with purposive-rational action (oriented toward technical 
rules, control/power, and productive forces) and interaction with com-
municative action (oriented toward social norms, reciprocity/individua-
tion, and communication free from domination) (1970, pp. 91-94). 1 4 But 
despite the obvious Weberian tone, these action types belong to Haber-
mas and are an important feature of his critique of Weber. Most impor-
tant, Habermas (1984, pp. 143-44, 172-73, 198, 221-22, 233, 243-71) 
claims that Weber's heavy emphasis on purposive rationalization (espe-
cially economic rationalization and bureaucratization) caused him to ne-
glect elaboration of his implicit normative concept of broader societal 
rationality and to stop far short of Habermasian communicative ratio-
nality. Thus Weber is thrust into Marx's bad company. Both theorists 
allegedly focused too narrowly on capitalist development and, conse-
Economy and Society), emphasize strongly the broad cultural significance of disen-
chanted ideas and worldviews, and describe a progressive movement in Western 
religious rationalization that runs counter to the relativistic, conflictual, and coercive 
themes of Weber's political sociology. Most important, like Habermas, they imply 
evolutionary normative justification in their portrayals of ethical rationalization. Also, 
Habermas has been influenced by Parsons's reading of Weber and his vision of pro-
gressive rationalization (though Habermas is critical of the Parsonian tendency to 
harmonize normative rationalization and organizational rationalization) (see Haber-
mas 1987c, pp. 283-99). Parsons claimed that Weber, like Marx, gave too much 
emphasis to coercive power and had an overly pessimistic view of rationalization too 
closely tied to domination and hierarchy. Supposedly, Weber caught this virus by 
attending too closely to Marx's problematic (Parsons [1937] 1968, pp. 510, 658, 752-
53; Parsons 1949, pp. 115-16; Parsons 1960, pp. 182, 219-20; Parsons [1947] 1964, 
pp. 58-60 n. 4; and for his views on progressive rationalization, see Parsons 1977). 
Finally, Jeffrey Alexander's (1983, 1985) criticism of Weber's alleged instrumentalism 
also has some affinity to Habermas's position. Nevertheless, Habermas differs funda-
mentally from these other theorists because his interpretation of Weber is part of an 
effort to revive critical theory. 
1 4 In his later work, Habermas (1984, pp. 172-74, 285-86) reconstructs Weber's ra-
tionality types and elaborates them into "instrumental action," "strategic action," and 
"communicative action." While the first two action types (subtypes of purposive-
rational action) have explicit roots in Weber's texts, communicative action reflects 
Habermas's own idea of normative rationality. This concept varies sharply from We-
ber's "value-rationality," which does not suggest consensual truth (Weber [1921] 1968, 
pp. 24-26). Weber thought societal consensus over ultimate values was impossible. 
Finally, as I will explain below, Habermas intends the concept of communicative 
action to fill out the unelaborated "broader societal rationality" supposedly implied by 
Marx, Weber, and critical theory. 
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quently, reduced Western rationalization to a march of purposive ratio-
nality. 
While, on one hand, he claims that Weber's one-sided political sociol-
ogy equates rationalization with expanding meaninglessness, domination, 
and regimentation, on the other, Habermas contends that his cultural 
analysis of disenchantment hints at a more "comprehensive concept of 
rationality" that provides a counterweight to the value-fracturing and 
socially coercing features of purposive rationalization (1984, pp. 216-22, 
243-54). Therefore, in the search for normative underpinnings, Haber-
mas puts aside Weber's strong emphasis on organizational rationalization 
and, instead, dwells on his account of religious rationalization. 1 5 
Habermas's universalistic normative intention comes clearly into view 
in his critique of Weber's concept of legitimacy (Habermas 1984, pp. 243-
71; Habermas 19796, pp. 178-205; Habermas [1973] 1975, pp. 97-110), 
where he argues that the emphasis on the "belief in legal procedure" is too 
insubstantial to support rational-legal domination and that it cries out for 
"moral-practical" justification. He believes that Weber's discussion of 
legitimacy implies the need for "rationally motivated agreement " The 
heart of the Habermasian critique is that Weberian legitimacy is purely 
"empirical" (it stresses exclusively the role of actual beliefs in historical 
domination systems) and therefore lacks the normative grounds for distin-
guishing illegitimate from legitimate domination. Here Habermas aban-
dons Weber's sociological and historical approach in an effort to uncover 
a normative standard of legitimacy. Within his revised critical theory, 
Habermas fashions this normative conception into a procedural demo-
cratic foundation to orient culturally and temporally relative social criti-
cism. But to ground his approach, Habermas must first elaborate the 
broader societal rationality that was totally occluded by Marxian materi-
alism. 
Following Weber, Habermas believes that the West is distinguished by 
the unique features of its Protestant culture, which produced profound 
disenchantment and differentiation of the magical and unified worldview 
of premodern society (Habermas 1984, pp. 186-242). Within the familiar 
story of Protestant secularization, 1 6 Habermas detects seeds of broader 
societal rationality and democratic legitimacy. Protestantism, in his view, 
1 5 Habermas (1987c, pp. 153-373) does not ignore purposive rationalization but treats 
it as a semiautonomous process that runs mostly counter to communicative rationaliza-
tion and democratization. 
1 6 Although Habermas (1984, p. 164) acknowledges Weber's balanced concern for 
material interests and ideal interests, he argues that Weber considered the "methodical 
conduct of life" to be "a—if not the—most important factor in the rise of capitalism." 
In his theory of communicative action, Habermas dwells much more on ideal than on 
material interests. And his reading of Weber reflects this theoretical inclination. 
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gave birth to a concept of community constituted of independent moral 
actors bound by voluntaristic commitment to common ethical norms. 
This ideal superseded the coercive and nonreflective morality of tradi-
tional societies. 
By reconstructing Weber's ([1930] 1958a, pp. 13-31) theory of Western 
cultural rationalization, Habermas establishes evolutionary grounds for 
his ultimate normative standpoint. Habermas (1984, pp. 176-81) argues 
that Protestant secularization culminates in three differentiated value 
spheres (scientific, artistic, ethical), each with its own distinct logic and 
each governed by a unique "universal validity claim" (truth, beauty/ 
authenticity, normative Tightness). 1 7 Most important, he asserts that the 
differentiation fosters "objective advances" in each sphere. Increased au-
tonomy and rationality (detail, consistency, and clarity) in the ethical 
sphere heighten the capacity of modern ethical norms for critical reflex-
iveness and make possible a rational and voluntaristic normative consen-
sus that harmonizes the need for social integration with the preservation 
of individual moral autonomy. Of course, this ethical integration is the 
opposite of the blind obedience commanded by Weberian bureaucracies 
and by traditional societies. The point is that Habermas sees, in Weber's 
theory of cultural rationalization, an implicit universalistic standard of 
societal rationality that provides grounds for a concept of democratic 
legitimacy. 
Habermas knows that Weber's conclusions about Western rationaliza-
tion were not as sunny and that intense value conflict and "pure 
utilitarianism" stood at the end of his story of capitalist disenchantment 
(Habermas 1984, pp. 241-42; Weber 1958a, pp. 180-83; Weber [1915] 
19586, pp. 355-57). However, Habermas defends his liberal reconstruc-
tion by arguing that Weber failed to finish his analysis of Protestantism, 
leaving the implicit logic of religious rationalization incomplete. In 
Habermas's view, Weber did not probe closely enough the Protestant 
"ethic of brotherliness," did not investigate sufficiently social movements 
(e.g., the Anabaptists) that expressed ethical rationalization in new forms 
of communality (instead of as capitalist acquisition), 1 8 and did not realize 
the degree to which "moral consciousness" could survive in the secular 
1 7 Habermas's (19796, pp. 29, 58) earlier discussion of validity claims (truth, rightness, 
truthfulness) anticipates his later reconstruction of Weber. The question remains 
whether he derived these concepts from another source and then read them into 
Weber's work, or the reverse. Most likely, Habermas has been influenced by Kant's 
division of science, morality, and art (see Rorty 1985, pp. 166-71). Weber's ideas 
about these matters suggest a much more complex differentiation of value spheres than 
suggested by Habermas (Lawrence Scaff drew my attention to this point). 
1 8 These matters were taken up by Michael Walzer (1965) in his study of Calvinism 
and radical politics. Perhaps Habermas was influenced by Walzer's work. 
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tradition of Enlightenment rationalism (Habermas 1984, pp. 229-33, 
242). Finally, Habermas (1984, pp. 249-54) claims that Weber simply 
exaggerated the level of value conflict. If Weber had only grasped 
the significance of value differentiation (i.e., Habermas's three value 
spheres), he would have realized that the abstract normative standards of 
modernity operate effectively and provide moral integration for the spe-
cialized and differentiated spheres of life. Habermas sees all these prob-
lems as deriving ultimately from the fact that Weber, like Marx, tied 
rationalization too tightly to capitalist development. And this one-sided 
emphasis on purposive rationality supposedly blinded Weber to the im-
plicit societal rationality contained in his own vision of religious disen-
chantment (Habermas 1984, pp. 198, 216-22, 233-42; Habermas 1987c, 
pp. 303-31). 
B E T W E E N T R A N S C E N D E N T A L I S M A N D HISTORICISM: 
HABERMAS'S BROADER SOCIETAL RATIONALITY 
His critiques of Marx and Weber set the stage for Habermas's (19796, 
pp. 1-68; Habermas 1984, pp. 1-141, 273-337; Habermas 1987c, pp. 1-152) 
theory of communicative action and standard of communicative rational-
ity. Habermas describes his approach as proceeding "reconstructively, 
that is, unhistorically," and as "no longer" starting with "concrete ideals 
immanent in traditional forms of life" (Habermas 1987c, p. 383). Conse-
quently, Habermas abandons the historical immanent critique of Marx 
and of classical critical theory. Although it contains elements from Marx-
ian and Weberian theory and borrows liberally from American pragma-
tism, interpretive sociology, linguistic philosophy, linguistics, and devel-
opmental psychology, the resulting normative theory is Habermas's own. 
The core idea is that a universal ideal of uncoerced communication 
underlies symbolic interaction. Human speech communities are based, 
ultimately, on an implicit normative content that is ethically rationalized 
in modernity into a conception of moral autonomy and mutual responsi-
bility (Mundigkeit) (McCarthy 1979, p. xvii). In a nutshell, Habermas 
argues that competent participants in speech situations must understand 
the difference between true and false statements and that true statements 
are those that would be reached if there were unconstrained discussion 
(Geuss 1981, p. 65). 1 9 This "counterfactual" substructure stands in stark 
1 9 Habermas (1979ft, pp. 1-5, 26-34, 56-59) argues that all successful speech acts raise 
implicit "validity claims": what is said ought to be comprehensible, true (in "proposi-
tions! content"), truthful (be a sincere expression of the speaker's intentions), and right 
(express a recognizable normative content). Social breakdowns or problems in com-
munication cause this background knowledge to be brought to consciousness and into 
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contrast to the "distorted communication" (based on deception, con-
straint, and coercion) of actual social interactions and provides a pro-
cedural ground for normative critique of the oppressive side of purposive 
rationalization. 
The universalistic normative claims go hand-in-hand with Habermas's 
evolutionary argumentation about increasing cultural capacities for 
realizing the potential contained within the "ideal speech situation." Pro-
gressive communicative rationalization of societal normative structures 
favors heightened awareness of the ideal of uncoerced consensus, in-
creased critical sensitivity to distorted communication, and improved 
social integration based on moral autonomy and mutual responsibility 
(Habermas 19796, pp. 69-129; Habermas 1979a; Schmid 1982). Haber-
mas borrows elements from psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's thought to 
argue that communicative rationalization is analogous to the process of 
individual moral development. Moral maturation proceeds from control 
based on external authority and punishment to self-regulation based on 
the individual's reflexive selection of moral norms (Habermas 19796, 
pp. 78-90). Accordingly, advanced moral development is characterized by 
highly abstract ethical principles (e.g., justice, reciprocity, equality, and 
individual dignity) and autonomous moral judgment, permitting morally 
reflexive responses to the specialized social settings and differentiated life 
spheres of modernity. 
Of course, this portrayal agrees with Habermas's aforementioned re-
construction of Weber's latent conception of broader societal rationality 
and, particularly, with Habermas's claims about the rationalization of 
Protestant communality and progressive differentiation of value spheres. 
Kohlberg's advanced stage of moral development is perfectly consistent 
with the type of rational and voluntaristic social integration discussed 
earlier. Habermas (19796, pp. 105-6, 152-58) hypothesizes that societal-
level communicative rationalization follows the same path as the moral 
maturation of the individual and that progressive normative stages can be 
demonstrated in the long-term development of Western law and morality 
(i.e., phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny). The evolution of communicative 
rationality has proceeded furthest in the West because the unique features 
of its Protestant heritage have permitted increased cultural expression of 
universal normative potentialities. 2 0 
social dialogues (Habermas 1987c, pp. 400-401). For comment on Habermas's com-
plex argument about "communicative competence," see Held (1980, pp. 330-46), 
McCarthy (1978, pp. 272-357; McCarthy 1979; McCarthy 1984), and Benhabib (1986, 
pp. 224-353). 
2 0 Habermas (19796, pp. 97-98) suggests that normative evolution is conditioned by 
"economic," "system," and "learning" processes. Also, he gives strong emphasis to 
counterdevelopments in the sphere of labor, contending that imperialistic purposive 
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Despite Habermas's evolutionary normative argumentation, his theory 
of communicative action does not reproduce the dogmatism of philo-
sophic absolutism or of evolutionary Marxism. First, the approach breaks 
with the absolutist "philosophy of consciousness" by locating the ultimate 
sources of normative validity in the social world rather than in the a priori 
characteristics of an intuited transcendental subject. Second, Habermas 
supplants evolutionary Marxism's ("philosophy of the subject") uncritical 
conception of a collective emancipatory subject with an approach that 
emphasizes the conditions for reaching intersubjective agreements about 
emancipatory goals (Habermas 1983, pp. 53-127; Habermas 1987a; 
Benhabib 1985; Wolin 1987). In this way, Habermas defines as prob-
lematic the process of communication that Marx left undeveloped and 
opens to dialogue the substantive normative content that official Marxists 
put beyond criticism. Habermas reconstructs the ideal of rational society 
into a social order where people resolve contested issues consensually by 
observing procedural norms of democratic discourse, resulting in com-
municatively rational, voluntaristic social integration. This approach 
avoids the main trap that ruined his Enlightenment predecessors and 
their more recent technocratic offspring; Habermasian democracy does 
not flow unproblematically from the stream of material and technical 
progress but must be achieved "communicatively." 
Still Habermas's moral universalism and evolutionary argumentation 
contain taints of the very positions he wants to leave behind. But he 
claims to make a clean break from these earlier a priori normative theo-
ries (Habermas 1987a, pp. 294-326; Habermas 19876, pp. 310-11; 
Habermas 1985d, pp. 195-98; Habermas 1984, p. 138; Habermas 1987c, 
pp. 396-403; Habermas 19796, pp. 21-25). Against those who would 
accuse him of transcendentalism (e.g., Geuss 1981, pp. 64-70), Haber-
mas argues that communicative rationality expresses "unproblematic 
background convictions" of speech acts, and, therefore, his universal 
normative standard is immanent in everyday social interaction (Haber-
mas 1984, pp. 70, 342-43; Habermas 1987c, pp. 113-52). This completes 
Habermas's highly complex maneuver. His embrace of modernity rules 
out a return to moral absolutism, while his critical approach to bourgeois 
values demands that he also reject historicism. Instead, he contends that 
rationalization, in the modern form of the "functionalist reason of system mainte-
nance," expands fiscal and bureaucratic imperatives and undermines voluntaristic 
social integration and democratic legitimacy. Habermas's discussions of "system inte-
gration" vs. "social integration," "system" and "lifeworld," "colonization of the 
lifeworld," and "new social movements" are relevant here but cannot be discussed in 
this paper (see Habermas 1975, pp. 1-31; Habermas 1984, pp. 70-71, 335-37, 397-
99; Habermas 19816; Habermas 1987c; Wellmer 1985a, pp. 51-57). 
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investigations of the taken-for-granted substructure of human communi-
cation yield universal procedural grounds for democratic legitimacy and 
that progressive rationalization unlocks more determinate potentialities 
of this underlying normative content. The shape of Habermas's norma-
tive foundation reflects his effort to steer a course between transcenden-
talism and historicism. 
IS IT EMANCIPATORY THEORY? ETHICAL FORMALISM A N D T H E 
SOCIOLOGICAL DEFICIT OF HABERMASIAN T H E O R Y 
Hard-line critics dismiss the theory of communicative action for being too 
thin historically, too moderate politically, and too rationalistic analyt-
ically to qualify as emancipatory theory. 2 1 Yet even Habermas's friendly 
interpreters contend that his theory cannot express the rich forms of 
intersubjectivity (i.e., modes of sympathy and collective identification) 
inherent in the social bonds that integrate communities and social move-
ments (e.g., Benhabib 1986, pp. 327-53). For this reason, they question 
the theory's capacity "to command the allegiance of its potential ad-
dressees" (Wolin 1987, p. 52). If dialectical materialism is analogous to 
Calvinist fundamentalism, then the theory of communicative action can 
be compared to Kantian ethical formalism. Because his universalistic 
normative stance applies to all modern social contexts, it has little sub-
stantive to say about any single context. Therefore, Habermas restores 
emancipatory theory formalistically, forsaking the bold historical claims 
about unmet needs and about specific possibilities for change that en-
livened Marx's historical immanent critique. And this problem of formal-
ism arises from the sociological deficit that accompanies Habermas's 
effort to derive a semiautonomous evolutionary logic of normative ration-
alization. 
Marx linked emancipatory values inextricably to conjunctural forms of 
socioeconomic organization and to accompanying patterns of association, 
cooperation, and needs. Likewise, Weber stressed the same type of histor-
ical interplay between normative structures and organizational condi-
tions. Habermas exaggerates the degree to which Marx's and Weber's 
organizational analyses expressed a triumphant march of purposive ra-
tionality. Though they treated rationalization as a single historical pro-
cess shaped centrally by capitalist development, the two classical theo-
2 1 They argue that Habermas's "minimalist" critique is nothing more than a philosoph-
ical justification for liberal reformism. This issue has been the focus of a divisive 
polemical debate within critical theory (e.g., Honneth 1979; Schmidt 1979; Feher 
1985; Whitebook 1985, 1986; Breines 1985; Wolin 1985; Gonzales 1985, 1986; Corradi 
and Piccone 1985-86). 
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rists recognized multiple and varied threads of material and ideal 
interests in complex and sometimes contradictory relationships. The un-
intended consequences of the resulting patterns of development produced 
possibilities for increased democracy as well as for intensified domination 
and coercion. Most important, by not separating normative rationaliza-
tion from organizational rationalization, Marx and Weber kept their ap-
proaches close to the historical process and avoided lapsing into the type 
of speculation that bankrupted the ideas of their more idealistically in-
clined contemporaries. 
Though Habermas acknowledges interdependence and interchange be-
tween the functional domain of societal organization and the normative 
realm of communicative action, his conceptualization of these two 
spheres as boundary-maintaining systems with fundamentally opposed 
developmental logics and, most important, his purely cultural analysis of 
communicative rationalization constitute a sharp break with the dialec-
tical, historical analysis of organization and values that characterized the 
sociologies of Marx and Weber. Consequently, though he formally recog-
nizes their importance, political economy and complex organization to-
gether become largely an abstract systemic backdrop for Habermas's 
normative theory. Yet these spheres of life are where many of the most 
pressing normative issues of modernity have meaning for people. Haber-
mas's democratic ideal is disembodied from the determinate types of 
substantive sociological and historical content that animated early eman-
cipatory theory and, thus, continues the philosophical drift of later criti-
cal theory. The theory of communicative action does not discourage the 
unfortunate tendency of many critical theorists to compensate for the one-
sided materialism of orthodox Marxism with an equally one-sided cul-
tural critique that ignores political economy and organizational analysis. 
But, despite the strengths of the sociologies of Marx and Weber, 
Habermas's critique of their thinly developed ideas about democracy is 
mostly on target. And they do not contain the key to elaborating the 
deeper forms of intersubjectivity missing from Habermas's approach. 
Contemporary normative debates about democracy and emancipation 
cannot be resolved by returning to Marx, Weber, or critical theory (see 
Cohen 1985). On the other hand, Habermas's formalistic normative argu-
ment does not resolve the old problems but does introduce new ones. 
CRITICAL THEORY DOWN TO EARTH: 
PRAGMATISM AND EMANCIPATORY THEORY 
The weaknesses and potentialities of Habermasian theory should be as-
sessed from the vantage point of its ambivalent relationship to American 
pragmatism. Although he embraces the pragmatist themes of radical 
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democracy and intersubjectivity, Habermas's emphases on ethical uni-
versalism and evolutionary normative justification contradict the ap-
proaches of George H. Mead and John Dewey. In a telling statement, 
Habermas (1985dy p. 197) implies that the pragmatists sought to replace 
the defunct form of religiously based social integration with "the unifying, 
consensus-creating power of reason." While taints of this view surely exist 
in the pragmatist tradition (particularly in the thought of Royce and 
Pierce), Mead and Dewey provide the basis of a radically secular ap-
proach that breaks fundamentally from the conception of normative con-
sensus that underlies the civil religion of Durkheim or Parsons as well as 
the milder procedural universalism of Habermas. 2 2 
Seyla Benhabib (1986, pp. 341-43) concludes her penetrating study of 
the foundations of critical theory with sympathetic criticism of Habermas 
that resonates with the pragmatist critique of ethical formalism. But 
Benhabib suggests that Habermas inherited his rationalistic, quasi-
Kantian universalism from Mead. She implies that Mead's universal 
communication community, 2 3 which supposedly underlies Habermas's 
conception of democratic legitimacy, pivots on an overly rational concep-
2 2 Habermas views Mead as a path-breaking thinker who recognized implicity the 
significance of communicative rationality but failed to express it fully and rigorously in 
theory (see Habermas 1987c, pp. 1-111; Ingram 1987, pp. 104-14; and for a brief 
summary of Mead's ethical theory, see Joas [1980] 1985, pp. 121-44). Though Mead 
stepped away from "the philosophy of consciousness" (by stressing intersubjectivity 
and communication), he supposedly did not give sufficient consideration to norma-
tively regulated action and to consensual communication and, thus, never completed 
the trek up the heights to communicative rationality. Habermas (1987c, pp. 14-15, 
22-25) contends that Mead did not take into account the alleged capacity of different 
interactants to ascribe "identical meaning" to a single gesture and overlooked the type 
of communicative action that culminates in "rationally motivated agreement." Still he 
claims (1987c, pp. 94-95) that Mead presumes communicative rationality in his cen-
tral concept of the "ideal communication community." Habermas (1987c, pp. 44-45) 
wants to plug the conceptual gap in Meadian theory by incorporating Durkheimian 
conceptions of collective consciousness and normative consensus. As in the "recon-
struction" of Weber, Mead is read as if he were on the brink of Habermas's project and 
in the broader tradition of Durkheim and Parsons, which envisions the fate of moder-
nity as hinging on the continued emergence of a normative consensus around highly 
generalized, secularized, and rationalized Protestant values (see Vidich and Lyman 
1985). This civil religion problematic is a theoretical cul-de-sac that yields evolutionary 
normative justification and ethical formalism. Conversely, the conception of radical 
democracy in the work of Mead and Dewey dispenses with civil religion and, for that 
reason, provides a more promising basis for appropriating the emancipatory elements 
of the Marxian and Weberian traditions. 
2 3 Though universals and universalism were sometimes mentioned in Mead's discus-
sions of normative matters, they referred to ideals that emerged from historically 
bounded universes of discourse. See n. 2 and Mead ([1934] 1967, pp. 82-90, 253-336). 
(Harold L. Orbach drew my attention to this point and has been extremely helpful in 
this entire section on pragmatism.) 
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tion of the "generalized other" too narrowly conceived to take account of 
the broader experiences of sympathetic understanding and mutual identi-
fication that bind people to communities and command their allegiance to 
social movements. 
Though her criticism of Habermas is well aimed, the weaknesses she 
identifies do not originate in Mead's thought. To be properly understood, 
the "generalized other" must be put in the context of what Mead called 
"sharing the attitudes of the other" (role taking) and the rich intersubjec-
tivity it entails. The sharing of attitudes is not restricted to rational crite-
ria but includes the capacity for sympathetic identification with other 
persons' needs, sufferings, and feelings. Contrary to Benhabib's view, 
Mead did not devalue the types of experiences that she associates with 
communality and detects rightly as being absent from Habermasian for-
malism. 2 4 The narrow vision of intersubjectivity follows, instead, from 
Habermas's effort to steer between transcendentalism and historicism. 
On the contrary, Mead's robust intersubjectivity goes hand-in-hand with 
pragmatist historicism and the full acceptance of the secular nature of 
modernity. 
By establishing intersubjective processes as the ultimate standards of 
normative validity, Habermas appears to integrate critical theory with 
pragmatism. Yet the fusion is partial and contradictory because he weds 
intersubjective normative standards uncomfortably to quasi-foundation-
alist universalism. The line of reasoning behind this approach can be 
detected in Habermas's (1973, p. 272; Habermas 1970, pp. 66-80) early 
writings, where he acknowledged an affinity between his own critique of 
technocracy and that of John Dewey but argued that Deweyan pragmat-
ism, applied today, overlooks "the structural change in the bourgeois 
public realm" and, consequently, appeals to uncritical norms that affirm 
technocracy (Habermas 1970, p. 69). 2 5 From the start, Habermas could 
accept only selected pieces of pragmatism, which he would later weave 
2 4 Benhabib does not deal directly with Mead's texts, and her comments about the 
"generalized other" seem to be based entirely on Habermas's reading of Mead and, 
particularly, on a short passage that Habermas quoted from Mead (Benhabib 1986, 
pp. 339-40; Habermas 1987c, pp. 94-95; Mead [1930] 1964, pp. 404-5). In a more 
recent essay Benhabib (1987, p. 78, n. 23) backs off from her criticism of Mead and 
states that the rationalistic concept of "generalized other" she criticizes does not belong 
to Mead. For the discussion of "sharing of attitudes," "generalized other," and "com-
munication community," see Mead (1967, pp. 253-336). 
2 5 Horkheimer (1974, pp. 41-57), in a primary text of the "dialectic of Enlightenment," 
argued that Deweyan pragmatism justifies the prevailing one-dimensionality of tech-
nocracy. While Habermas is much more sympathetic to Dewey, taints of the older 




into a universalistic normative theory that contradicts central tenets of 
the pragmatist approach to values. 
Dewey contended that ethical universalism generates a legalistic at-
titude that robs morality of its spontaneity and relevance for life (Dewey 
and Tufts 1985, pp. 275-83), degrades practical activity (Dewey [1929] 
1984c?, p. 58), and sets "up ends without means for their realization" 
(Dewey and Tufts 1985, p. 344). And evolutionary normative arguments 
do not escape the problems of the older forms of absolutism (Dewey [1927] 
1984c, pp. 357-58). According to the pragmatists, all normative content, 
even that which is supposed to be true in all places and for all times, 
arises from specific cultural and historical contexts. In Dewey's view, 
universalistic claims are usually intended to drape historical institutions 
with a legitimacy that is impervious to critical dialogue (Dewey 1984<f, 
p. 211) or to impose the goals of political leaderships and planning elites 
(Dewey 1984c, pp. 360-61). But even when they are not a cover for an 
elitist agenda, universalistic claims diminish normative dialogue about 
social issues. Arthur Edward Murphy (1965, pp. 329-30) expressed this 
antiformalist position eloquently: 
We must have grounds more relative than this. The notion that concrete 
issues of better and worse, right and wrong, can be settled by a "rational" 
reference to good in general, from the point of view of the universe, which 
our own "reason" somehow "dictates" that we follow is at once pretentious 
and equivocal. Our reasons are not, and should not be, of this morally 
rootless and disembodied sort. They are the considerations we learned to 
understand and honor as obligations in the family, the community, the 
nation into which we were born, and in whose shared life we have become 
such moral agents as we are. And these are not universal communities; they 
have a local habitation and name. . . . And in this work, what is too good 
for this world is, for practical and moral purposes, not good enough. It is, 
as we have now amply seen, an evasion, not an effective answer, to our 
actual problems. 
Dewey was not naive about bourgeois ideals. He argued that the na-
tional community they once reflected had already passed away (1984c, 
pp. 304-24) and that these ideals now justify technocratic planning and 
elite decision making (1984c, p. 329). Yet he also believed that more 
determinate forms of democratic values existing at the face-to-face level 
of everyday associations in families and neighborhoods still provided 
immanent valuative grounds for democratic critique (1984c, pp. 325-50, 
367-72). The heritage of democracy, in his view, is reappropriated daily 
at the local level, where it is refashioned in cooperative activities, dealing 
with contemporary situations and experiences of need and expressing 
still-existing communal bonds. But these normative understandings are 
often unspoken and tend to be excluded entirely from national-level dia-
logue. 
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Pragmatist public philosophy counters mass-media propaganda and 
political demagoguery with symbols and moral rhetoric that give voice to 
these living moral bonds and take them beyond the boundaries of local 
communities. Like Marx's historical immanent critique, Dewey's "experi-
mental method" calls for testing the normative claims of public values 
against the historical realities that they supposedly depict and for revising 
them in response to existing communal understandings and existing un-
met needs (1984c, pp. 361-62). Of course the pragmatists understood that 
restoring a democratic public at the national level was a formidable task. 
That their efforts yielded no shining path to democracy reflected both the 
strengths and limits of a method that was intended to express the pos-
sibilities of the day. 
Clearly, the communication community implied by Dewey bears little 
resemblance to the narrow rationalism decried by the critics of Habermas 
and mistakenly attributed to Mead. Dewey argued that moral bonds 
emerge from experiences of cooperative activities, common needs, and 
shared history and that these bonds are sustained "emotionally" and intel-
lectually (1984c, p. 330). Dewey ([1926] 1984a, [1926] 19846) and the 
pragmatists rejected the tendency of Western religious and philosophical 
thought to oppose moral experience to sensuous life and, instead, consid-
ered morality to contain affective, aesthetic, and material as well as 
rational threads. Dewey's (1984c, pp. 367, 371) "free and full intercom-
munication" referred to the rich intersubjectivity essential to the mainte-
nance of community and to the vitality of social movements. 
The pragmatist themes of communication, community, and democracy 
provide the type of corrective to Marxism called for by Habermas and 
other critics of Marxist economism. In particular, Dewey demolished the 
central economistic dogma (of the Right as well as the Left) that "social 
interdependency" and "harmony" would someday flow automatically 
from advances in production and exchange (e.g., 1984c, pp. 332-33; 
Dewey 1935, pp. 6-11, 35). On the other hand, Dewey's approach still 
has affinity for Marx's historical immanent critique. And similar to 
Marx's, Dewey's normative theory is framed within a critique of subjec-
tive idealism, emphasizing the unity of theory and practice (1984c, 
p. 224). Most important, Dewey argued that economic issues ought to be 
at the center of moral dialogue because the achievement of the good life 
depends on the maintenance of its material underpinnings. He argued 
that economic standing determines the scope of one's participation in the 
cultural life of modernity (1984d, pp. 224-25) and that class domination 
was a characteristic feature of the new technocracy (1984c, p. 362). Since 
Dewey treated the organizational and normative dimensions interac-
tively, the critique of economism did not diminish the sociological powers 
of his approach, nor did it justify one-sided cultural critique. 
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But pragmatism is no cure-all. It does not contain a secret remedy for 
democratizing mass society, nor does it promise to solve all the varied and 
complex problems that have long plagued emancipatory theory. Finally, 
it is not a substitute for critical theory. 2 6 Instead, my point has been 
merely to make a case for completing the secular and intersubjective turn 
in critical theory begun by Habermas and to encourage a broader dia-
logue with pragmatism. 2 7 Such an encounter between the two traditions 
would force emancipatory theory, finally, to come to terms with the 
historical claims upon which it was founded. The problem of formalism 
can be overcome, and the true limits of immanent critique clarified, only 
after all the pseudohistorical baggage is left behind. For those who are 
passionately committed to emancipatory values, facing the historical pro-
cess without illusions is a risky proposition. Yet only a fundamental 
reconstruction of the approach on this purely temporal plane can bring 
emancipatory theory down to earth and, possibly, back to the center of 
public consciousness and discussion. 
The demise of the orthodox Left has nearly put an end to reified hopes 
about the march of a historical metalogic and the progressive emergence 
of a collective emancipatory subject, but new foundationalist tunes are 
being played outside official Marxist circles. The problems of transhistor-
ical normative justification and ethical formalism extend far beyond the 
borders of emancipatory theory. Because of the multiple crises of the past 
20 years (e.g., the decline in public-spiritedness, the full bloom of the 
culture of narcissism and possessive individualism, the ineffectiveness of 
the "overloaded state," and multiple disruptions from international eco-
nomic restructuring and deindustrialization), many social and political 
theorists now warn about the precarious condition, of the cultural and 
economic substructure of liberal democracy. Normative approaches rang-
ing from the Straussian and neoconservative Right to the social demo-
cratic and critical Left (e.g., Bell 1976; Bellah et al. 1986; Bloom 1987; 
Bowles and Gintis 1986; Eden 1983; Gewirth 1978; Ignatieff 1986; 
Nozick 1974; Phillips 1986; Rawls 1971; Sullivan 1982; Vidich and Ly-
man 1985) have raised repeatedly the need to shore up the normative 
underpinnings of Western democracy to avert a slide into despotism. 
2 6 Since they were reformists, the pragmatists did not build a strong Utopian dimension 
into their theories. The vision of radically different modes of consciousness and radi-
cally transformed modes of social being have been a primary feature of the emancipa-
tory tradition and essential to its goal of appealing to people to alter the course of 
history (Douglas Kellner reminded me of this point). 
2 7 Richard Rorty (e.g., 1979, 1982, 1985, 1987) calls for a closer relationship between 
pragmatism and social critique and has criticized Habermas's quasi foundationalism 
on this account. See Habermas's (1987ft) response to Rorty and also Rick Roderick's 
(1986, pp. 8-13) critique of the antifoundationalist position. 
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Lurking beneath these normative defenses is the image of a dystopian 
regime far more oppressive than the depoliticized managerial order feared 
by critics of commercial society from Tocqueville to Marcuse. Haber-
mas's so-called minimalism or joyless reformism must be put in the con-
text of these apparent threats to the civilizing features of bourgeois society 
(e.g., rule of law, citizenship rights). 2 8 But, if liberal institutions are really 
in trouble, ethical universalism, even in the conditioned and undogmatic 
form of Habermasian theory, can do little to help. 
The new foundationalism has not gone unchallenged. At the other 
extreme, "postmodernists" 2 9 preach an antimoralist line, claiming to de-
fend cultural diversity against imperialistic moral rationalism. Between 
the lines of their difficult "genealogical" and "deconstructionist" jabs at 
ethical holism is the recycled pessimism of the "dialectic of Enlighten-
ment." But the earlier round of this antirationalist broadside was fired 
during the euphoric expansion of consumer society, when, despite Joseph 
McCarthy, citizenship rights were expanding, and the underpinnings of 
liberal democracy seemed secure. Pessimistic critical theorists tried to 
supply brakes for overweening postindustrial optimism. However, today, 
can the postmodernist condemnation of the mildest emancipatory argu-
ments (e.g., Habermas's defense of democracy) as repressive "grand nar-
ratives" be considered a corrective? Radical postmodernism leaves no 
space for broader moral rhetorics that address the problem of declining 
2 8 Habermas (1981a, p. 15; Habermas 1981c, pp. 8-9, 13-14; see also Jay 19846, pp. 
6-7) states that the "real motive" of his recent work is to preserve "the project of 
modernity." He opposes the onslaught of postmodernists who accept moral diversity 
but reject global defenses of democracy (see Lyotard [1979] 1984) as well as that of 
neoconservatives who call for a return to traditional values and obedience to authority 
(see Bell 1976). This theoretical debate over modernity has been waged in an era of 
conservative assault on the welfare state, cultural warfare by the far Right and fun-
damentalist religious groups, and exhaustion of the Left. Habermas construes his 
normative theory as an affirmation of Enlightenment rationalism and democratic 
political institutions in the face of a rising wave of irrationalism, traditionalism, and 
authoritarianism. See Habermas (1981c, 1982, 1985a, 1985c, 1987a), Giddens (1981), 
Benhabib (1981), Foster (1984), Bernstein (1985), Wellmer (19856), Hohendahl (1985, 
1986), and Jay (19846). Habermas's sympathetic critics further elaborate his basic 
concern about the fate of democracy (e.g., see Thompson and Held 1982; Cohen 1982; 
Keane 1984; McCarthy 1985; Misgeld 1985; Giddens 1985; Fraser 1985; Halfmann 
1985; Ferrara 1985; Rorty 1985; Benhabib 1981, 1985, 1986; Sciulli 1985, 1986; Wolin 
1987). 
2 9 Postmodernism is a vague conception that includes a broad range of positions and 
overlaps poststructuralism. My own argument has postmodernist features since it is 
historicist and pluralist. My critical comments are aimed at the more radical versions 
that reduce the world to discourse and that forbid global moral rhetorics. See Berman 
(1982), Baudrillard (1983), Lyotard (1984), Wolin (1984/1985), Kroker (1985), Cal-
linicos (1985), Kroker and Cook (1986), Dews (1987), and Kellner (1988). 
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national community. It is silent about societal-level strategies for dealing 
with mounting unmet needs, the retreat from welfarism, or the down-
ward compression of the middle class and, consequently, fails to confront 
the threat of despotism. 
By conditionally affirming modernism and preserving the emancipa-
tory ideal of the Enlightenment in the much scaled-down form of a "rea-
sonable society," pragmatism provides an alternative to f o u n d a t i o n a l 
formalism and to postmodernist cynicism. Most important, pragmatist 
moral rhetoric provides a starting point for an approach that breaks 
fundamentally with the repressed Protestantism and stale moralism still 
latent within much sociological theory and sublimated in ideals of norma-
tive agreement. Pragmatist social integration depends on the capacity to 
share attitudes and does not rely on value consensus; sympathetic under-
standing of the other does not require agreement or homogeneity. Indeed, 
the pragmatists' guarded optimism about modernity was based on their 
belief that the flexible role-playing required by specialized organizational 
structures and differentiated spheres of life would increase the capacity to 
share attitudes and, at the same time, increase tolerance of diversity. 
Under these conditions, disputes can be resolved by compromise and 
trade-offs grounded in mutual understanding and compassionate under-
standing of difference. The pragmatist communicative ideal does not 
implicitly call for the re-creation of an idealized village culture at the 
societal level and, therefore, veers away from the Utopian visions of 
consensual national communities that sometimes provide justification for 
totalitarian "moral" orders. 
Fundamentalist forms of moralism, which seem to abound nowadays, 
directly undermine efforts to confront the burning issues of the day so-
berly and openly. A broader cultural revival of pragmatist realism surely 
would provide a good sociological antidote to this absolutist current and a 
democratic counterpunch to the despotic shadow that may follow the next 
serious recession. And emancipatory theorists have the opportunity to 
initiate this critical dialogue. 
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